

## Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 AEC-11 AF-10 ARA-16 CIAE-00 DODE-00

EA-11 EUR-25 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 IO-14 L-03 NASA-04

NEA-14 NSAE-00 NSC-07 OIC-04 SP-03 PA-04 PRS-01

RSC-01 SCI-06 SS-20 USIA-15 SAJ-01 DRC-01 /211 W

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R 240840Z MAY 74

FM USMISSION GENEVA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5971

INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY TOKYO

AMEMBASSY VIENNA

USMISSION IAEA VIENNA

USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

USMISSION NATO BRUSSELS

AEC GEERMANTOWN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 GENEVA 3249

DISTO

EO 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM

SUBJ: CCD: THRESHOLD TEST BAN ISSUE AT SPRING SESSION

REF: GENEVA 2873

ALSO POUCHED TO: ADDIS ABABA, ANKARA, ATHENS, BELGRADE, BRASILIA,  
BRUSSELS, BUDAPEST, BUCHAREST, BUENOS AIRES, CAIRO, THE HAGUE,  
HELSINKI, ISLAMABAD, LAGOS, MEXICO, NEW DELHI, OSLO, OTTAWA, PARIS,  
PRAGUE, RANGOON, RIO DE JANEIRO, ROME, SOFIA, STOCKHOLM, AND WARSAW

1. SUMMARY: AMERICAN PRESS REPORTS TO THE EFFECT THAT  
THE US AND USSR WERE NEGOTIATING A THRESHOLD TEST BAN  
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(TTB) AROUSED CONSIDERABLE INTEREST HERE AND WHILE THIS

HAS NOW SUBSIDED SOMEWHAT BECAUSE OF THE ABSENCE OF ANY CONFIRMATION FROM THE US OR USSR, MANY CCD REPS PROBABLY STILL SPECULATE THAT A TTB IS IN PROSPECT. SOME ARE CONCERNED ABOUT THE ARMS CONTROL VALUE OF A TTB AND ALSO THAT THE TWO SUPERPOSERS MIGHT NEGOTIATE SUCH AN AGREEMENT IN FINAL FORM ENTIRELY OUTSIDE THE CCD. SOVIET AMB ROSHCIN, HOWEVER, HAS INDICATED HE PERSONALLY FEELS IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE NOT TO INVOLVE CCD IN NEGOTIATION OF A TTB AFFECTING ONLY US AND USSR. END SUMMARY.

2. AS REPORTED REFTEL, THE NY TIMES ARTICLE ON THRESHOLD TEST BAN NEGOTIATIONS ATTRACTED GREAT INTEREST HERE. HOWEVER, AFTER AN INITIAL ROUND OR INFORMAL EXCHANGES WITH JOURNALISTS AND CCD REPS, DURING WHICH WE USED GUIDANCE PROVIDED IN STATE 092978, CORRICOR DISCUSSION OF THE SUBJECT HAS SUBSIDED SOMEWHAT. WE HAVE ALSO NOT HAD ANY FURTHER INQUIRIES FROM THE JAPANESE AND NATO CCD DELS, WHO WE HAD BRIEFED IN ACCORDANCE WITH STATE 093044. THERE HAS BEEN ONLY ONE INSTANCE IN WHICH THE QUESTION OF A POSSIBLE TTB WAS ALLUDED TO IN A PLENARY STATMENT? THIS WAS THE ITALIAN SPEECH ON MAY 16 WHICH WAS GENERALLY FAVORABLE TO THE IDEA OF "PARTIAL MEASURES" RELATED TO NUCLEAR TESTING (GENEVA 3076)

3. DESPITE THE USG LINE TAKEN HERE AND IN WASHINGTON WITH REGARD TO THE NY TIMES REPORT, WE ESTIMATE THAT MANY DLES PROBABLY STILL SPECULATE THAT A TTB MAY BE IN THE OFFING. IN RECENT YEARS, OUR ALLIES ON THE CCD HAVE, IN VARYING DEGREES, FAVORED A TTB. THE JAPANESE IN PARTICULAR HAVE ADVOCATED A TTB AT AN INITIAL MAGNITUDE OF 5.76 TO BE FOLLOWED BY ONE AT MAGNITUDE 5.25. IN CONTRAST, SWEDEN, ETHIOPIA AND MOROCCO (ALONG WITH THE SOVIETS) HAVE IN THE PAST BEEN CRITICAL OF THE TTB IDEA, THOUGHT THEY DID NOT RESTATE THESE CRITICISMS AT THE SPRING SESSION. IN CORRICOR CONVERSATIONS, US DELOFFS HAVE HAD ONLY LIMITED OPPORTUNITIES TO EXCHANGE VIEWS INFORMALLY WITH OTHER REPS ON THE SUBJECT OF A TTB BECAUSE WE CONFIDENTIAL

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DID NOT WANT TO RISK HAVING OUR APPARENT INTEREST IN THE ISSUE CONTRIBUTE TO FURTHER SPECULATION. IN THESE LIMITED CONTACTS DURING THE SPRING SESSION, US DELOFFS DID NOT ENCOUNTER ANY EXPRESSIONS OF OPPOSITION TO THE IDEA OF A THRESHOLD TEST BAN AND IN ONE INSTANCE THE ROMANIAN COUNSELLOR (TUDOR) EXPRESSED CONSIDERABLE ENTHUSIASM FOR THE IDEA, THOUGH HE WAS NO DOUBT ONLY SPEAKING PERSONALLY. WE SUSPECT THAT MOST DELEGATIONS

WERE WITHOUT UP-TO-DATE INSTRUCTIONS ON THE TTB  
ISSUE.

4. WE HAVE, HOWEVER, ENCOUNTERED INDICATIONS OF CONCERN  
ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE US AND USSR MIGHT  
COMPLETELY NEGOTIATE A TTB ENTIRELY OUTSIDE THE CCD.  
THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S SPECIAL REP (PASTINEN) HAS  
BEEN PARTICULARLY CONCERNED ABOUT THIS (REFTEL).  
MORE RECENTLY, THE DEPUTY JAPANESE REP (YATABE) TOLD  
A US DELOFF THAT IT WOULD BE MOST REGRETTABLE IF A  
TTB WERE NEGOTIATED BILATERALLY BY THE US AND USSR  
WITHOUT REFERENCE TO THE CCD, PARTICULARLY IN VIEW  
OF ALL THE DISCUSSIONS AND ATTENTION WHICH HAVE BEEN  
FOCUSED ON THIS PROBLEM OVER THE YEARS AT THE  
COMMITTEE. THE YUGOSLAV DEPUTY REP (MIHAJLOVIC) ALSO  
INDICATED TO US THAT HE THOUGHT SUCH A DEVELOPMENT  
WOULD BE VERY REGRETTABLE BUT HE SEEMED ALMOST  
RESIGNED TO IT AS ONE MORE EXAMPLE OF "COLLUSION" ON  
THE PART OF THE SUPER-POSERS. MIHAJLOVIC ALSO  
EXPRESSED THE MOST SKEPTICAL ATTITUDE WE HAVE YET  
ENCOUNTERED ABOUT THE ACTUAL SIGNIFICANCE OF A POSSIBLE  
TTB AS AN ARMS CONTROL MEASURE. HE SAID HE PRESUMED  
THAT IF THE US AND SOVIET UNION WERE TO AGREE TO A  
TTB, IT WOULD SIMPLY BE BECAUSE THEY FELT THAT THEY  
COULD CONTINUE THEIR WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT SATISFACTORILY  
BY TESTING BELOW THE AGREED THRESHOLD AND WERE THUS  
TAKING THIS STEP LARGELY AS A SOP TO WORLD PUBLIC  
OPINION.

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ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 AEC-11 AF-10 ARA-16 CIAE-00 DODE-00

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RSC-01 SCI-06 SS-20 USIA-15 SAJ-01 DRC-01 /211 W

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R 240840Z MAY 74

FM USMISSION GENEVA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5972  
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON  
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USMISSION USUN NEW YORK  
USMISSION NATO BRUSSELS  
AEC GERMANTOWN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 GENEVA 3249

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5. IN JUDGING THE SUBSTANTIAL VALUE OF A TTB, WE BELIEVE NON-ALIGNED WOULD PRIMARILY WANT TO DETERMINE WHETHER IT WOULD ACTUALLY INCREASE THE LIKELIHOOD OF A CTB OR, AS THEY MIGHT FEAR, PROVE TO BE ONLY A CONVENIENT RESTING PLACE FOR THE US AND USSR. THE INDIAN NUCLEAR TEST WILL HEIGHTEN PRESSURES FOR A COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN AND MAKE THE NON-ALIGNED INCREASINGLY SKEPTICAL ABOUT THE VALUE OF ANY MEASURE FALLING SHORT OF A CTB. IF THEY WERE PRESENTED WITH A TTB AS A FAIT ACCOMPLI, DOUBTS AND SKEPTICISM ABOUT THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE MEASURES WOULD PROBABLY INCREASE AND BE AUGMENTED BY RESENTMENT ON THE PART OF OUR ALLIES, AS WELL AS THE NON-ALIGNED, OVER THE SUPERPOWERS' FAILURE TO CONSULT THEM. UNDER CONFIDENTIAL

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SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES, ONE WOULD OBVIOUSLY FACE GREATER OBSTACLES IF ONE WANTED TO WIN WIDER ADHERENCE TO SUCH AN AGREEMENT AND THIS WOULD ALSO REDUCE THE LIKELIHOOD THAT IT WOULD BE RECEIVED AT THE UNGA AND THE NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE AS A SIGNIFICANT NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL MEASURE.

6. AT THE CO-CHAIRMEN'S LUNCHEON MAY 23, SOVIET AMB ROSHEHIN REVIEWED THE PROBLEMS THAT WOULD ARISE AT THE CCD IF A TTB WERE NEGOTIATED IN FINAL FORM BY THE TWO SUPERPOWERS ENTIRELY OUTSIDE THE COMMITTEE. HE STATED, HOWEVER, THAT HE PERSONALLY FELT THAT THE US AND USSR WOULD FACE EVEN MORE DIFFICULTIES IF THE CCD WERE TO BE INVOLVED SUBSTANTIALLY IN A TTB NEGOTIATION. ROSHCHIN FELT THAT A US/ SOVIET TTB PROPOSAL WOULD ALMOST INEVITABLY MEET WITH CRITICISMS, AMENDMENTS AND OTHER COUNTER-PROPOSALS FROM THE CCD NON-ALIGNED. HE SAID HE THEREFORE THOUGHT THAT IT MIGHT BE BETTER TO HANDLE ANY TTB AS A PURELY BILATERAL NEGOTIATION BETWEEN THE US AND

USSR WITHOUT ANY PARTICULAR EFFORT TO WIN WIDER ADHERENCE  
OR ENDORSEMENT FOR THE MEASURE. ROSHCIN STRESSED,  
HOWEVER, THAT HE WAS SPEAKING PERSONALLY AND HE ALSO  
EMPHASIZED THAT HE HAD NOT MADE ANY RECOMMENDATION TO  
HIS AUTHORITIES AS TO WHETHER OR NOT THE CCD SHOULD BE  
INVOLVED IF THERE WERE TO BE TTB NEGOTIATIONS.  
ABRAMS

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## Message Attributes

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**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
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**Draft Date:** 24 MAY 1974  
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**TAGS:** PARM, US, UR, NEW YORK TIMES, CCD  
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**Type:** TE  
**Markings:** Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005